TCP Control Groups: Aggregated Congestion Control for TCP (MA Thesis)

This thesis presents a framework for aggregated congestion management for TCP flows and shows how to integrate such an approach in an existing TCP protocol stack. The thesis presents an initial implementation of this congestion management scheme in Linux, with performance evaluation in ns as well

Costs of Control in Groups

This paper explores the role of social groups in explaining the reaction to control.We propose a simple model with a principal using control devices and a controlledagent, which incorporates the existence of social groups. Testing experimentally theconjectures derived from the model and related literature, we find that agents in socialgroups (i) perform more than other (no-group) agents; (ii) expect less control thanno-group agents; (iii) decrease their performance substantially when actual controlexceeds their expectation, while no-group agents do not react; (iv) do not reciprocatewhen facing less control than expected, while no-group agents do.

Business Groups in Emerging Markets-Financial Control & Sequential Investment

Business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated firms. One explanation is that business groups substitute some functions of missing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. We investigate this by setting up a model where firms within the business group are connected to each other by a vertical production structure and an internal capital market. Thus, the business group’s organizational mode and the financial structure allow a self-enforcing contract to be designed. Our model of a business group shows that only sequential investments can solve the ex post moral hazard problem. We also find that firms may prefer not to integrate.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/57210/1/wp830 .pd

Business Groups in Emerging Markets - Financial Control and Sequential Investment

Business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated firms. One explanation is that business groups substitute some functions of missing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. We investigate this by setting up a model where firms within the business group are connected to each other by a vertical production structure and an internal capital market. Thus, the business group’s organizational mode and the financial structure allow a self-enforcing contract to be designed. Our model of a business group shows that only sequential investments can solve the ex post moral hazard problem. We also find that firms may prefer not to integrate